Old State, New Society: Indonesia’s New Order in Comparative Historical Perspective

BENEDICT R. O’G. ANDERSON

It is perhaps too easy, in the age of the United Nations, to read “nation” as merely a convenient shorthand expression for “nation-state” and thereby to overlook the fact that a tiny hyphen links two very different entities with distinct histories, constituents, and “interests.” Yet the briefest backward glance reveals that their current marriage is a recent and often uneasy mating. As late as 1914, the dynastic realm was still the “norm”—a realm defined not by common language, customs, memories, or permanently demarcated borders, but rather by high monarchical centers—hence figures like the Tsar of All the Russias, the Son of Heaven, the Sublime Porte, and the Queen of England-cum-Empress of India. The great majority of today’s nation-states were “born” in the period from 1800 to, say, 1975 from titanic conflicts between “nations” as extrastate solidarity movements and dynastic or colonial “states.” Thus, the youth of most nations was, shall we say, a stateless youth.

Similarly, most states have genealogies older than those of the nations over which they are now perched. The truth of this proposition is exemplified by some entertaining contemporary anomalies. For example, the “revolutionary” and “socialist” rulers of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China find nothing bizarre in pursuing their territorial quarrels by brandishing maps and treaties produced by absolutist Romanovs and the “feudal” Manchu Ch’ing dynasty. In the same way, there are dozens of cases of ex-colonial states pursuing foreign policies that are remarkably similar to those pursued by their predecessors—even though diametrically opposed “national interests” are formally represented by these states. (See, e.g., Maxwell’s learned and witty account of independent India’s Curzonesque policy along its northern frontiers [1970].) Finally, we are also familiar with the fact that in most of the national states of the Third World (and elsewhere, though less obviously) the narrower lineaments of older states are still quite evident: organizational structures, distributions of functions, personnel, institutional memories in the form of files and dossiers, and so on.

The contemporary conflation of nation and state undoubtedly derives from the following convergence. On the one hand, the imagined (but by no means imaginary) community of the nation, whose legitimacy and right to self-determination have become accepted norms in modern life, finds the gage of that autonomy in a state “of its own.” On the other hand, the state, which can never justify its demands on a community’s labor, time, and wealth simply by its existence, finds in the nation its modern legitimation. The nation-state is thus a curious amalgam of legitimate fictions and concrete illegitimacies (Anderson 1983). The conflation is all the easier
because the "state" is a notoriously slippery entity for political theory and political sociology. It is only too easy to collapse it into either a legal fiction or a collectivity of persons ("the bureaucracy"). The fact is that the state has to be understood as an institution, of the same species as the Church, the university, and the modern corporation. Like them, it ingests and excretes personnel in a continuous, steady process, often over long periods of time. It is characteristic of such institutions that "they" have precise rules for entry—at least age, often sex, education, etc.—and, no less important, for exit—most notably, mandatory retirement. No more impressive sign exists of these institutions' inner workings than the steady rotation out of its top leaders (corporate presidents, senior prelates, distinguished academicians, high civil servants, and so on). And, like its sister institutions, the state not only has its own memory but harbors self-preserving and self-aggrandizing impulses, which at any given moment are "expressed" through its living members, but which cannot be reduced to their passing personal ambitions.

Under these circumstances, one would expect to find in the policies pursued by nation-states a variable mix of two types of general interests—those we can think of as the state's and those of the nation's, perhaps best conceived of as "representational" or "participatory" interests. One can thus imagine a sort of spectrum between the following polar situations. (The ensuing distinctions are a variation on those drawn with great brio in Alers [1956].) One situation would be a condition of foreign occupation or colonialism, for example, France under German, or Japan under American occupation; "Indonesia" under Dutch colonialism or "Vietnam" under French. In all these instances, the "state" continues to carry out its modern functions—collecting taxes, administering services, printing money, organizing judicial proceedings, and so on, and the personnel in the state's employ are "nationals" to an overwhelming extent. Notice that nothing under these conditions predetermines the level of welfare of the subjected populations. Under American occupation, Japanese society made a remarkable recovery from the disaster of war, and no one could deny that, in some ways, the colonial regimes in Vietnam and Indonesia made signal contributions to the "progress" of the colonized. What nonetheless is clear is that "national" participatory interests were almost completely ignored or suppressed. The other situation, one of incipient revolution, is where the state is disintegrating, and power shifts decisively into the hands of extrastate organizations typically recruited on a voluntary and mass basis.

If these are the polar cases, the policy outcomes of nation-states under unexceptional circumstances will typically represent a shifting balance between the two "interests" sketched above. I propose that this framework is a useful optic for interpreting modern politics in Indonesia. In particular, I would argue that the policy outcomes of the "New Order" (ca. 1966 to the present) are best understood as maximal expressions of state interests; and that the validity of this argument can usefully be gauged by reflecting on the history of the state in Indonesia. My aim here is not primarily to weigh the benefits to the population of successive regimes, but rather to develop an appropriate framework for comparative historical analysis.

**Ancestry: The Colonial State**

The birthdate of the "Indonesian" state remains a matter of controversy among scholars, but its birthplace is quite clear: the swampy coastal township of Batavia, which the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) made the center of its island
empire at the beginning of the seventeenth century. If, from the perspective of Amsterdam, the VOC appeared as a business (of variable profitability), in the archipelago it manifested itself almost from the start as a state—raising armies, concluding treaties, imposing taxes, punishing lawbreakers, and so forth. Moreover, even in embryo, this state exhibited a concern for its own political-territorial aggrandizement quite aside from considerations of commercial advantage (see, e.g., Boxer 1965: 84–97). When it was formally replaced, early in the nineteenth century, by the Dutch crown, the same impulse continued to be evident. Indeed, the Indonesia we know today is the exact product of the extraordinary extension of Batavia’s politico-military power between 1850 and 1910 (Vlekke 1959: chap. 14, “The Unification of Indonesia”). Many of these conquests made little sense in terms of economic profitability or even of military security.1 Some were financially disastrous. Frequently, the crucial decisions were made in Batavia rather than in The Hague, and for local raison d’état. The Aceh War (1873–1903) is a fine case in point (Vlekke 1959: 320–21).

By 1910 the colonial state, acting through its own military force, the Royal Netherlands Indies’ Army (Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger, hereafter cited as KNIL), had successfully imposed rust en orde (tranquillity and order) throughout its vast possessions, a system of control not seriously disturbed until it was demolished in a few weeks in 1942 by Japanese invaders. If the state’s horizontal expansion had come to a halt early in this century, the opposite was true of its vertical penetration. Under the “Ethical Policy” there was a huge extension of the state apparatus deep into native society and a proliferation of its functions.2 (Furnivall [1944] remains the classic on this process.) Education, religion, irrigation, agricultural improvements, hygiene, mineral exploitation, political surveillance—all increasingly became the business of a rapidly expanding officialdom, which unfolded more according to its inner impulses than in response to any organized extrastate demands.

What were the bases for this aggrandizement? The answers become clear when we look at the taxation and personnel policies of the mature colonial state. In 1928, the last good year before the Depression, the state derived roughly 10 percent of its income from state monopolies in salt, pawnbroking, and opium (which it sold to its customers at 10 times the open-market Singapore rate) (Rush 1977: 278); 20 percent from the profit of state-owned mines, plantations, and industries; 16 percent from import duties; 10 percent from corporation taxes; 6 percent from land-rent; and 9 percent from income taxes. Various excise and other regressive indirect taxes made up the remainder. (The above data are calculated from Vandenbosch [1944: 298–305].) If we remind ourselves that this was an economy that then produced 90 percent of the world’s quinine, 80 percent of its pepper, 37 percent of its rubber, and 18 percent of its tin—to say nothing of petroleum—it is clear that, like the old VOC state, the late colonial state derived its financial strength largely from its own monopolistic operations and an efficient exploitation of local human and natural resources.

For the other side of the picture, we must turn to the pattern of government spending. In 1931, no less than 50 percent of the state’s expenditures were devoted to

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1 In this sense, the conquests are the exact lineal forebears of the attempted annexation of East Timor after December 7, 1973.

2 The end product is aptly epitomized by “Rumah Kaca” [The Glasshouse], the Foucaultian title of volume 4 (alas, still unpublished) of Pramoedya Ananta Toer’s great tetralogy on the rise of Indonesian nationalism. A sardonic glimpse of the Glasshouse under construction is in Onghokham (1978).
its own upkeep (Vandenbosch 1944: 172). One reason for this pattern was that the NEI state imported from Europe nine times as many officials proportional to native population as did British India (excluding the "native" states) (Vandenbosch 1944: 173). (This was a relatively recent development, because in 1865 there were only 165 "European" officials in the territorial administration of the 12 to 13 million population of Java (Fasseur 1975: 91.) Yet the Europeans still numbered only slightly over 10 percent of the entire state apparatus. In 1928, there were almost a quarter of a million native officials on the state payroll (Vandenbosch 1944: 171). To put it another way, 90 percent of the colonial civil service was composed of "Indonesians," and the state's functioning would have been impossible without them. As Benda has written (1966), this situation represented the last stage in the long process by which various strata of (largely Javanese) native ruling classes had, since the mid-nineteenth century, been absorbed and encapsulated into an ever more centralized and streamlined colonial beamtenstaat. (Sutherland [1979] has done an excellent study of the Javanese territorial bureaucracy in later colonial times.)

Three and a half years of Japanese military rule (March 1942 to August 1945) came close to destroying this iron cage. In the first place, the territorial unity of the colonial state was broken up. Java, Sumatra, and eastern Indonesia were ruled separately by the Japanese Sixteenth and Twenty-fifth armies, and an arm of the Japanese Navy. In each zone divergent policies were pursued, and there was little administrative contact, let alone rotation of personnel, among them. Second, as a result of this division and of the wartime collapse of the colonial export economy, the resource base of the state(s) disintegrated, along with its (their) inner financial discipline. On Java, the military authorities coped with this crisis by imposing harsh levies in labor and kind, and by reckless printing of money. Hyperinflation rendered official salaries meaningless, and a profoundly demoralizing corruption spread rapidly through the apparatus. Third, the abrupt removal of experienced Dutch officials, their replacement by relatively inexperienced Japanese and suddenly promoted Indonesians, and wartime dislocations and shortages drastically undermined the efficacy of the state machine. Finally, the brutal exploitative nature of occupation policy in its later stages aroused deep popular hatred, a hatred substantially directed at a native officialdom increasingly regarded as quisling. Thus, in the aftermath of the Japanese surrender in August 1945, in many parts of Java and Sumatra the state almost disappeared in the face of popular insurgence (Anderson 1972: chaps. 6, 7, and 15). In other parts of "Indonesia," fragments of the old beamtenstaat went their own merry way.

State and Society, 1945–1965

On August 17, 1945, the well-known nationalist politicians Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed Indonesia's independence in a brief ceremony in the front yard of Sukarno's private home in Jakarta. Insofar as the two had any "official position" at all, it was as chairman and vice-chairman of the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence, a body hastily created by the Japanese less than a week earlier. The following day, the twenty-odd members of this committee "elected" Sukarno to the novel office of President, thus formally combining leadership of the new nation with that of the old state (Anderson 1972: chap. 4). Even though Sukarno never thereafter submitted himself to any larger electorate, this does not alter the significance of the state-leadership office being defined for the first time in representative terms.
The symbolism of these acts, which took place physically and politically outside the state, reminds us that Sukarno’s previous career was built entirely on the mobilization of popular forces (the nationalist movement) and in long-standing opposition to the colonial state. Not only had Sukarno never been an official of that state, but he had been spies on by its informers, arrested by its police, tried by its judges, and imprisoned and internally exiled for almost eleven years by its top bureaucratic directorate (Legge 1972, esp. chaps. 5 and 6). And many of those who spies on, arrested, and sequestered him—not to speak of those who steadfastly obstructed his political work in the periods when he was free—were “Indonesian” members of the state apparatus.

During the four years of the Revolution (1945–1949) that followed, there were really two states functioning in the archipelago—that of the infant Republic and that of the returning Netherlands Indies. Gravely weakened by wartime Nazi occupation and economic devastation, Holland still disposed of far greater military and financial resources than the Indonesian nationalists. By the end of 1946, it had resumed control of the entire eastern half of the archipelago, and a year later it had occupied virtually all the major export-commodity-producing zones in Java and Sumatra. As its power grew, it was able to reassemble many segments of the old beamtenstaat. In the wake of the second “Police Action,” launched on December 19, 1948, the colonial state seized every significant urban center and captured the persons of Sukarno, Hatta, and other top Republican leaders (Kahin 1952; Alers 1956; Reid 1974).

The rival Republican state was weak from the start and got weaker as the years passed. The political reliability of much of its inherited personnel was suspect; many of its new members entered it laterally, and as “revolutionaries” with utterly un-beamtenstaat visions, experiences, and skills. Not a few assumed offices within the state without long-term official careers in mind. The state’s low inner coherence was accentuated by its poverty. What authority it had, it largely borrowed from its old adversaries, the nationalist leaders.3 These leaders, in turn, now found it in their interest to protect the apparatus for three tactical reasons: they were anxious to deny the Dutch as much of the old beamtenstaat as possible, recognizing that in many ways it was more important to their adversaries than to themselves; they found it on occasion useful in their internal struggles for power; and they hoped to win international recognition for a sovereign nation, a recognition given only to nations-with-states.

If the Dutch were finally forced to concede defeat, the reasons had little to do with the Republican state. The prime factor was a highly localized popular resistance, above all in Java and Sumatra, expressed through a myriad of extrastate political-military organizations, locally recruited, financed, and led (beautifully demonstrated in Kahin, A., 1979). What linked these myriad resistances together was not the state, but a common vision of a free nation.4 War weariness among the Dutch and powerful American diplomatic and financial pressures also contributed to the dra-

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3 See Anderson (1972: 113–14) for an account of the one-sided negotiations between the nationalist leaders and top representatives of the state on August 30, 1945, and chap. 15 for an analysis of why Sukarno and his associates lent their prestige to reviving the authority of ex-colonial officialdom.
4 The emblem for this condition is Aceh. The first major region to go into rebellion after independence (1953) in protest against meddling from Jakarta, during the Revolution it was the center’s most selfless supporter, freely contributing large sums of money to the financially hard-pressed Republican authorities in Java (who were in no position to exact taxes through a state).
matic turnabout by which, at the end of 1949, sovereignty was formally transferred from Holland to the United States of Indonesia.

This new internationally recognized entity represented internally a fragile amalgam of the two adversary states of the previous four years—militaries, civil bureaucracies, incipient legislatures, financial resources and liabilities, including a $1,130 million debt inherited from the NEI state (Kahin, G., 1952: 433–53), as well as complexes of institutional memories. Furthermore, each “half” of the amalgam was, for different reasons, weak. The “NEI half” was politically tainted with collaboration and deprived of its inner Dutch spine; the “Republican half” had not recovered from its pulverization in 1948–1949. And when, in 1950, as a result of popular, extrastate agitation, the United States of Indonesia was turned into the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia, the fragility of the amalgam was not significantly reduced. It could easily be argued that parliamentary democracy survived in Indonesia until about 1957 simply because no other form of regime was possible. There was no coherent civil bureaucracy. No dominant nationwide political party had emerged. No centralized, professionalized armed forces (including an “industrial” navy and air force for archipelagic control) existed, capable of seizing power. Parliamentary democracy, with its emphasis on popular representation and on extrastate political organization and activity, “fitted,” one might say, the existing realities and expressed the current preponderance of nation and society over state.

The weakness of the state, which became ever more conspicuous as the élan of the independence struggle faded into memory, can be seen along three dimensions: military, economic, and administrative.

As early as 1950, hostility between ex-Republicans and ex-KNIL components of the amalgamated armed forces erupted into violence in Java and Sulawesi, and led to the attempted secession of the “Republic of the South Moluccas.” (See Feith’s accounts of the “Westerling Affair” in West Java and the “Andi Aziz Affair” in South Sulawesi [1962: 62, 66–68].) Soon afterwards, so-called “regional revolts” occurred in many parts of the archipelago, most notably in formerly strongly Republican areas. Finally, a full-scale civil war broke out in 1958 between the Republic of Indonesia and the self-styled Revolutionary Republic of Indonesia, which counted among its leaders some of the best-known political and military figures of the Revolution. These conflicts were made possible because the Revolution had been fought by local guerrilla forces, over which a small and inexperienced central staff had little more than a certain moral authority. The upshot was that, like postwar Burma, the independent state of Indonesia was for years unable to exert military control over sizable parts of its cartographic domain.

In economic terms, the state not only presided over a war- and revolution-shattered economy, but it was burdened with heavy inherited debts and had few effective means of levying taxes. Moreover, until 1957, the “Big Five” giant Dutch conglomerates continued to dominate much of the advanced revenue-producing sectors as well as interisland shipping. The country’s oil industry was overwhelmingly in Dutch, American, and British hands. Small wonder that the postcolonial state glowed with the dim, fitful radiance of a klieg lamp powered by flashlight batteries.

During the 1950s, the administrative coherence and discipline of the civil service apparatus continued to crumble. In part, this was the result of the rancor between the two halves of the amalgamated post-1950 apparat. In part, memories of how officials had been deposed, kidnapped, and even killed during the Revolution lowered morale and encouraged self-protective passivity. But most important was the penetration of
the state by society. Already during the Revolution, some offices and functions of the beamtenstaat had been taken over by persons who would have been walled off from it in the colonial era: elderly Islamic kyai became district officers, teenagers organized medical and alimentary public services, and functional illiterates assumed important local military commands. Such people “joined” the state, but their fundamental loyalties were typically to nation, ideological grouping, paramilitary organization, local community, and so forth. After 1950 the penetration continued, in the first instance via the political parties. Building nationwide parties in a nation of roughly 100 million people was naturally an expensive proposition. The leaders found that a cheap way to develop their organizations was to enroll supporters inside the state apparatus. Thus, the civil bureaucracy swelled from a 1940 figure of about 250 thousand to a 1968 figure of about 2,500 thousand—a tenfold increase in a generation (Emmerson 1978: 87). An economically weak state was in no position to pay this vast body adequately (and so maintain some inner institutional discipline). The inevitable consequences were spreading corruption (some personal, some for party coffers) and declining efficacy. And insofar as all governments of the 1950–1957 period were coalitions of parties, departmental segmentation under patronage politics became ever more serious. By 1957 there was no better indication of the “porousness” of the state than the passage of Law No. 1/1957, which made regional executives (kepala daerah) elective (party-supported) rather than centrally appointed (Legge 1961: chap. 9).

But it was not only the parties that penetrated the apparat. During the Revolution and its immediate aftermath, many of the traditional collaborationist upper classes in the more backward parts of the Outer Islands lost, or feared losing, much of their old power and wealth. Feeling vulnerable in the electoral arena, they were eager to protect their lineages’ futures by sending their children into the burgeoning civil service academies. These young minority-aristocrat officials added an often energetically conservative and particularistic “ethnic” dimension to the kaleidoscopic inner life of the state (Magenda, forthcoming).

However, at the same time two powerful forces came, toward the end of the parliamentary period, to the rescue of the state. The most important of these was the army. Throughout the decade, the army was convulsed by inner conflicts, but gradually the high command in Jakarta succeeded in strengthening its authority (McVey 1971–72). It pursued a policy of promoting professionalism and corporate cohesion through training overseas—mainly in the United States—and, in Indonesia itself, the development of increasingly complex, centrally controlled educational institutions. In addition, it managed to build with heavy external assistance its own elite strike force, which reached maturity in the 1960s as the Army Strategic Reserve (KOSTRAD). Thanks largely to Soviet aid, the center acquired a sizable navy and air force (organizations that, given their high capitalization, are unlikely to emerge from decentralized guerrilla forces). As a result, by 1962 the army leadership had largely managed to suppress regional military dissidence and to bring the old NEU’s territory under unified control for the first time since 1942. Each military success meant the elimination of competitors for intramilitary ascendancy. The grip of Java-based officers on the high command increased, while Javanese troops became de facto occupiers and controllers of much of the Outer Islands.

Finally, the army leadership found the means to resist the forces that had so fractionalized the civilian arms of the state apparatus. The year 1957 marked the turning point. On March 14, President Sukarno declared martial law for the whole
country in response to the regional crisis, thereby giving the military vast emergency powers. These powers were used initially to curb the activities of the parties, above all the Communist party (PKI), to suppress party-controlled veterans' organizations, and to seal the military off from party linkages. Then, in December, when militant trade unions seized much of the vast Dutch corporate empire in retaliation for The Hague's intransigence on the West New Guinea issue, the high command stepped in to supplant the unions (Lev 1966: 34, 69–70). Quite suddenly, it took control of the bulk of the advanced sectors of the economy. Thus, for the first time it obtained the financial means to attach the officer corps firmly to itself and to give the military as a whole a corporate economic interest quite distinct from that of every other sector of Indonesian society. For the first time since 1942, the major economic resources of the nation were now under unified local control.

Allied with the army leaders was the charismatic figure of Sukarno. In the development of regional unrest, culminating in the outbreak of civil war in February 1958, he perceived a growing threat of national dismemberment, a threat all the greater in that the United States (at least its left hand, the CIA) was financing and arming the dissidents. He was increasingly convinced by experience that the coalition party cabinets were incapable of overcoming the threat, indeed, that even his own personal prestige was, by itself, insufficient for that task. Only the army had the power and the means. It was necessary, therefore, to give the army leaders what they insisted they needed: martial law, curbing of the political parties, control over the Dutch enterprises, and the cancellation of Law No. 1/1957. It is probable also that he had come to believe that the final retrocession of West New Guinea to the Republic could only be achieved by building up a military force that the Dutch (and the Americans) would have to take seriously.

However, Sukarno was fully aware that the consolidation of the army offered for the first time the possibility of a successful coup and the installation of a military-dominated regime. Accordingly, he was quick to use his political prestige and his legal authority under the 1945 Constitution (reinstated in 1959 by his personal decree) to prevent the suppression of the parties and their affiliated mass organizations.\(^5\) The coalition between the army high command and Sukarno made relatively smooth the transition from "parliamentary" to "Guided Democracy." But it was a coalition of expediency that began to break down as soon as the immediate interests of the partners no longer coincided. The consequences of the conflict between them, and between the forces they increasingly came to champion, were first a period of great instability and ultimately the cataclysmic events of 1965–1966.

From Sukarno's point of view, the prime purposes of the coalition—the absorption of the entire former Netherlands East Indies into the Republic and the restoration of unitary authority in the archipelago—had been achieved by early 1963, when a shrewd mixture of diplomacy and military bluff finally succeeded in stirring the Americans to arrange the retrocession of West New Guinea (via an interim United Nations administration). The price for all this, however, had been high. It was not merely that the army had greatly increased its power and inner cohesion. In addition,

\(^5\) This is not to deny that Sukarno had long chafed under the limits imposed on him by the parliamentary constitution of 1950 or that he enjoyed the vastly increased powers assigned the presidency under that of 1945. Moreover, in protecting the parties and popular organizations (except for the Socialist party and the Islamic Masyumi, which he banned for participation in the PRRI), he was certainly motivated by a need for organized political support as a counterweight to the army. Indeed, so concerned was he about the army's intentions that he went out of his way to show favor to the navy, air force, and police.
the long-maturing, intimate ties between the army and the United States had clearly given the regionally dominant foreign military power a dangerous point d'appui deep within the Indonesian state. As Sukarno perceived it, this penetration imposed significant limits on the sovereignty of the Indonesian nation and on its ability to manage its internal affairs with the maximum autonomy. Furthermore, the army's control of the former Dutch enterprises had now put it into a directly antagonistic relationship with the popular sector—the workers and peasants employed in the mines, plantations, and other major commercial enterprises. Sukarno thus increasingly came to feel not only that his personal position was threatened, but that the original goals of the nationalist movement were endangered. (See Legge 1972: chaps. 12–13; Hauswedell 1973.)

One can think of his solution to this problem as having two distinct, if interrelated, components. The first was to encourage a remobilization of extrastate popular organizations ("returning to the rails of our Revolution") under his personal ideological leadership. (On May 1, 1963, immediately after Jakarta assumed sovereignty over Irian Barat [West Irian], Sukarno lifted martial law, giving the parties renewed freedom of activity.) Paradoxically enough, this effort was greatly facilitated by the absence of elections under Guided Democracy. The punctuational rhythms and legislative focus of parliamentary constitutionalism were replaced by an accelerating of mass politics penetrating ever more widely down and across Indonesian society. The major political parties of the period—the PKI, the PNI, and the conservative Muslim NU—threw themselves into expanding not merely their own memberships, but those of affiliated associations of youth, women, students, farmers, workers, intellectuals, and others. The result was that by the end of Guided Democracy each of these parties claimed, with some justification, to be the core of a huge, organized, ideological "family" each about 20 million strong, which competed fiercely for influence in every sphere of life and on a round-the-clock basis. Hence the popular penetration of the state, which had been stemmed, and even reversed, after the declaration of martial law in 1957, resumed. Even the armed forces were put under penetrative pressure by Sukarno's campaigns for the "Nasakom-ization" of all state institutions and, in 1965, for the formation of a Fifth (Armed) Force composed of popular volunteers. (Nasakom was an acronym for Nasional-Agama-Komunis, i.e., Nationalist-Religious-Communist. The other four forces were, of course, the army, navy, air force, and police.)

Second was an increasing emphasis on economic autarchy and an actively anti-imperialist foreign policy. A full exploration of the reasons for this strongly nationalist policy lies beyond the scope of this essay. For our immediate purposes, it is enough to note that the policy was intended to encourage popular mobilization under Sukarno's direct, personal aegis, while minimizing its disintegrative potential. It was also aimed at decreasing the leverage of the United States in Indonesian domestic politics. Both the President and his political supporters were well aware of the enormous importance of the "American connection" (training, funds, weapons, intelligence, etc.) to the army leaders and saw in a sustained campaign for national

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6 This point is nicely illustrated by long-time (1958–1965) American ambassador to Indonesia, Howard Jones, in his inimitable memoir: "In terms of power politics it would mean placing our best bets squarely on the Indonesian army . . . to preserve the pro-American, anti-Communist loyalties of the top officer group in the army" (1971: 126–27).

7 See Hindley (1962). Borrowing from Hindley, one could argue that Sukarno in fact aimed at the domestication of all Indonesian political groups. Cf. Anderson (1965).
political and economic autonomy a subtle, but effective, way of maneuvering toward the breaking of that connection. 8

Events soon proved, however, that Sukarno's politique was unsustainable—at least under the circumstances of the time. The fundamental reason was economic. Indonesia was simply too poor to afford simultaneously a huge military buildup to make a militant foreign policy credible; an autarchic economic policy that worked to extrude much foreign capital and also left the existing advanced productive sectors under inexperienced and venal military management; and a huge mobilization of competing popular movements. The only method available to cope with the resulting financial pressures was the printing of money in ever vaster quantities. In a sort of replay of the Japanese period (and for comparable structural reasons), the value of the *rupiah* fell ever more rapidly; between early 1962 and late 1965 its black market exchange value with the United States dollar changed from Rp. 470 to Rp. 50,000 in a steeply ascending curve after the middle of 1964 (Mackie 1967: 98–99, table 3). This hyperinflation affected every aspect of Indonesian life and sounded Guided Democracy's death-knell.

For present purposes, the most important consequences were two. On the one hand, as in the later Japanese period, the efficacy of the civilian side of the state apparatus disintegrated as corruption and absenteeism proliferated and communication, transportation, and revenue collection broke down. (This did not stop the bureaucracy from continuing to grow—one might almost say metastasize.) The one apparatus capable of sustaining itself was the army, partly because it was "legally" closed to party penetration, partly because it controlled the bulk of the country's real, as opposed to paper, assets. Thus, the last years of Guided Democracy marked an accelerating ascendancy of the army vis-à-vis all other arms of the state administration. On the other hand, the hyperinflation exacerbated domestic antagonisms to the point of explosion. As the living standards of the poor rapidly declined, the PKI was put under heavy pressure by its constituents to struggle more militantly for their material interests. The legal ban on strikes in so-called "vital" (i.e., state-controlled) enterprises made trade union militancy difficult and risky. Prospects seemed better in the countryside, and in 1964 the PKI began its *aksi sepibah* (unilateral mass actions) to force implementation of the rather mild Share-Cropping and Land Reform laws of 1959 and 1960. (On the *aksi sepibah* in context, see Mortimer [1972].) The timing could not have been worse, for one consequence of the hyperinflation was a rush out of cash into land (on the part of those who had the cash), and a heightened determination on the part of those who already owned land to hang on to it. In the first group were many officials, civilian and military; in the second, those local notables so strongly represented in the regional leaderships of the NU and the PNI. (See Mortimer 1972; Lyon 1971: and Rocamora 1974.) Anti-PKI rural violence had already begun months before the eruption of Lieutenant Colonel Untung's September 30th Movement (Mortimer 1972: 48–50; Walkin 1969), presaging the massacres of 1965–1966 under the direction of the army leadership, which swept Guided Democracy—and soon thereafter Sukarno—into history.

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8 Unsurprisingly, no such campaign was launched against the "Soviet connection"—not because the PKI was on good terms with the CPSU, which it was not—but because Soviet military supplies went to the army's service rivals, the navy and the air force.

9 In particular, the policy of "Confrontation" with the newly formed Federation of Malaysia, launched in September 1963.
Suharto, the State, and the New Order

The argument of the final section of this essay is that the New Order is best understood as the resurrection of the state and its triumph vis-à-vis society and nation. The basis for this triumph was laid in the physical annihilation of the PKI and its allies, the suppression of popular movements, sweeping purges of the state apparatus, and the removal of President Sukarno as an effective political force—all achieved between October 1965 and April 1966. But the character of the triumph cannot be understood without a look at the earlier career of General Suharto, before turning to consider a few of the more arresting components of the policies consistently pursued over the past fifteen years, for the two are intimately related. (The following biographical sketch is drawn from various published and unpublished sources, including Roeder [1969] and McDonald [1980: chaps. 1–2].) Born in 1921 as the son of a village official in the central Java principality of Yogyakarta, Suharto grew up during the Depression. The economic crisis, his father’s inconspicuous social position, and the limited educational opportunities afforded by the NEI regime meant that his formal schooling ended when he was graduated in 1939 from a private Muslim secondary school in Solo. In the summer of 1940 he applied for and was admitted to a basic training course offered by the colonial army, and in December proceeded on for further training. By the time the Japanese invaded Java in March 1942, Suharto had risen to the rank of sergeant. Like his near-contemporaries Ironsi, Amin, Bokassa, Eyadema, and Lamizana, he thus began his ascent to state leadership from the noncommissioned stratum of the colonial state’s military apparatus—one quite separate from the Royal Netherlands Army, and one whose small size (about 33 thousand in 1942) shows that its essential mission was less external defense than internal security. If the Japanese had not invaded, Suharto would probably have ended his active days as a master-sergeant—officership in the KNIL was essentially a white prerogative. With the crushing and dissolution of the KNIL, Suharto joined the police, and again, had Japan won the Pacific war, Suharto would probably have worked his way up the Japanese colonial security apparatus. But in the autumn of 1943, in the face of steady Allied advances, the Japanese military authorities in Java decided to set up a native auxiliary force named Peta (consisting of 66 battalions, locally recruited and deployed, with no central staff, and battalion commander as its highest rank) to assist in the defense of the island. Suharto joined this decentralized force and eventually became a company (about 100 men) commander in it. This force was in turn dissolved when the Japanese surrendered in August 1945; had the Dutch been in a position to resume control immediately, like the British in Malaya or the Americans in the Philippines, it is quite possible that Suharto would have rejoined a resuscitated KNIL or the colonial police. There is no evidence of any nationalist activity on his part until after the proclamation of Indonesia’s independence.

But he was quickly swept up by the Revolution. In the largely spontaneously formed, ill-trained, and poorly armed Republican armed forces, his experience in two colonial militaries and his native abilities led to a rapid rise in rank. The 21-year-old sergeant of 1942 was by 1950 a 29-year-old lieutenant colonel with a good military reputation and excellent prospects. Thereafter, his main field activities were participation in the suppression of regional and Muslim dissidence and leadership of the militarily unsuccessful operations against the Dutch in West New Guinea.
Possibly because he was among the minority of senior officers who did not undergo training in the United States, he was appointed by Sukarno as the first commander of the army's elite strike force, KOSTRAD. It was from this office that Suharto destroyed the September 30th Movement and the PKI in 1965-1966. (He held de facto presidential power only after the coup de force of March 11, 1966, and formally supplanted Sukarno as President only in 1968.)

These details on Suharto's career have been organized to underline one central point: that it has been made entirely within the state, more particularly within the internal security apparatus. (Sukarno was never an official of any kind.) The other side of the coin, however, is that this official lived through and experienced in the most intimate way the collapse of the Dutch and Japanese colonial regimes, and the extraordinary vicissitudes of the state in independent Indonesia. Nothing was better calculated to encourage an abiding anxiety about the stability and security of the state (yet, as we have seen, Suharto's present eminence was only made possible by that state's fragility). It is understandable then that the consistent leitmotiv of New Order governance has been the strengthening of the state-qua-state. The best evidence for this proposition is the thrust of certain characteristic New Order policies in the economic, sociopolitical, and military areas.

Economic Policy

I have no intention of denying that many of Indonesia's technocratic planners have sincerely aimed at raising the living standards of the population, improving social welfare, and modernizing the structure of the economy (no more than one would deny such intentions to many officials of the colonial beamtenstaat, particularly those of an "Ethical" bent). The interesting question, however, is why Suharto and his closest military associates so quickly adopted the "development strategy" propounded by arch-technocrat Professor Widjojo Nitisastro and his entourage. I am inclined to argue that the basic initial decisions were made in order to overcome the enormous problems created by hyperinflation—which, more than anything else, had destroyed Guided Democracy. Price stabilization was an absolute prerequisite for any new regime (we can be sure that a triumphant PKI would have pursued the same objective, if by different methods). But bringing inflation under control was not merely necessary for the broad purpose of stabilizing the economy and restoring some sense of normalcy to the life of society, it was also essential for reconstituting the discipline, cohesion, efficacy, and power of officialdom. The apparatus had to be provided with a stable hierarchy of emolument, and at a sufficient level to command a unified subordination and loyalty. (Compare the outlays on officialdom in the calm, autocratic days of the colonial beamtenstaat, cited above.) Because the state itself was then still too weak and chaotic to undertake measures to raise the necessary resources domestically, Widjojo had little difficulty in showing Suharto that massive external support was essential and that gaining this support required policies designed to win the sympathy of the Western capitalist powers and Japan. Hence, in rapid succession: the liquidation of "confrontation" with Malaysia, and the end of formal (and, of course,

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10 This said, we should not ignore the fact that much of Suharto's career coincided with periods in Indonesian history in which popular political forces were quite strong relative to the state, and that, accordingly, many officials' survival depended on learning some basic political skills. It would not be an error to think of Suharto simply as a bureaucrat, even a wily and intelligent one.
INEFFECTIVE) price controls in 1966; the return of many nationalized enterprises to their former owners and the promulgation of an easy-going foreign investment law in 1967; the rationalization of banking and interest rates in 1968; the end of multiple exchange rates between 1968 and 1971; and so on.

The results were quick in coming: over half a billion dollars in aid in 1968 and an annual IGCI fix’ on a colossal scale ever since. Cumulative aid up to the eve of the great OPEC windfall late in 1973 amounted to over $3 billion. We may gauge the significance of these sums by comparing the lowest IGCI commitment of the pre-1974 era—$534 million in 1969—with total net government expenditures and receipts in 1957 (the last year of constitutional democracy) and 1960 (a good year for Guided Democracy); these amounted to $660 million and $500 million (1957) and $200 million and $180 million (1960). (These amounts, converted at prevailing black-market exchange rates, are calculated from data in Mackie [1967: 96–98] and Weinstein [1976: 369–70, Appendix B].)

It was above all these massive inflows, in some years covering 50 per cent of the cost of all imports, that allowed Suharto to build, over the course of the 1970s, the most powerful state in Indonesia since Dutch colonial times. (The OPEC windfall and the revival of raw-material exports simply accelerated the process.) They also permitted him to dissolve with few serious short-term costs the extrastate anticommunist coalition that had helped to bring him to power in the first place.

We should not forget one other important advantage of the annual IGCI fix,” namely, that the money came directly and exclusively to the center and without any significant state outlays in the form of a tax-gathering apparatus. In other words, not only was the power of the state vis-à-vis society vastly enhanced, but within the state the center came decisively to dominate the periphery.

Much the same could be said of the New Order’s generally amiable attitude toward mono- and multinational foreign investment despite what might seem substantial political disadvantages—not merely the “material” alienation of a significant component of the independent indigenous entrepreneurial class, but a much broader dissatisfaction among the population, deriving from the heritage of the nationalist movement and from fear of foreign economic domination. The key to understanding this long-standing complaisance lies in recognizing the advantages that multinationals offer the state-qua-state. Thanks to their hierarchical structures, they provide the center with sizable, easily accessible revenues (taxes, commissions, etc.). They are ready, up to a point, to be model taxpayers, thereby obviating the need to extract income from what one might call “Grade A pariah entrepreneurs,” meaning that their executives have neither the interest nor the capacity to pursue political ambitions inside Indonesia. These corporations present no direct political threat to the state as a powerful indigenous business class might do. And we should

11 It might be argued that, because these enterprises passed out of the state’s hands into those of foreigners, a significant loss of state power was involved. In fact, these enterprises were so run down by years of military bleeding and economic chaos that the real cost in 1967 was quite small. In return for these retrocessions, the military-dominated state shortly received rewards many times larger, as I note below.

12 For a brief overview of the components of the coalition and its progressive dismemberment, see Anderson (1978). The weakness of this analysis lies in a gross underestimation of the staying power of the beamtenstaat as of 1978.

13 This stance is by no means without its nuances, and it would be a mistake to regard New Order policy as unqualifiedly “open door.” It is useful in this context to bear in mind the twenty-year struggle of the Kultuurstelsel’s beamtenstaat against private colonial capital (1848–1868); and of the twentieth-century colonial state’s monopolies and often ambiguous relations with non-Dutch conglomerates.
remember that the state does not keep all this wealth to itself: much of it is funnelled 
out into society in the form of contracts, grants-in-aid, loans, and so on. Thus, 
indigenous entrepreneurial elements ravaged from one side by the multinationals may 
profit handsomely from another side—but only by the grace of the state. They may 
prosper, but this prosperity cannot form the basis of any challenge to officialdom. 

Sociopolitical Policy

Under this rubric, three policy lines are of special interest: the state’s formula for 
Indonesia’s political future; its handling of “the” Chinese, both citizens and aliens; 
and its relationship with its prime “class base.”

It is striking that the New Order has never publicly proclaimed itself an 
emergency, provisional, or even a tutelary regime. It holds out no prospects for a 
“return to civilian rule” or a “restoration of representative government.” In this 
sense, it belongs in what Nordlinger calls the “ruler-type praetorianism” category, a 
distinct minority (he estimates no more than 10 percent) among military-dominated 
regimes (1977: 26). The state leadership has attempted to persuade its audiences that 
this “no-change” future is legitimate, by insisting that a peculiarly Indonesian form 
of democracy is actually already in place: Pancasila Democracy. It points to the facts 
that elections are regularly held, that opposition parties are represented in national 
and provincial legislatures, and that Suharto himself holds office through an (indirect) 
electoral mechanism.

In reality, elections are carefully manipulated, and with some thermostatic sophis-
tication: Golkar (the state party) won 62.8 percent of the vote in 1971, 62.1 percent 
in 1977, and about 64 percent in 1982 (for details, see Nishihara 1972; Ward 1974; 
parties not only have had their leaderships emasculated by General Ali Murtopo’s 
Special Operations organization, but sit in legislatures with what in practice are 
permanent state-appointed majorities (Crouch 1978; chap. 10; Heri Akhmadi 1981: 
58–76). No one has ever stood against Suharto in a presidential election. Furthermore, 
there is the doctrine of dwifungsi (dual function), now enshrined as a fundamental 
aspect of Pancasila Democracy. This doctrine states that the Indonesian Armed Forces 
have permanent responsibilities in the fields both of national security and of social-
political-economic development. Under this banner, the military have massively 
penetrated all hierarchies of the state apparatus and most aspects of society’s life. 
(Emmerson’s data [1978: 101–105] are strikingly confirmed in MacDougall’s recent 
quantitative analysis [1982].) Finally, the semi-official doctrine of the “floating 
mass” (originally coined in 1971) in effect says that Indonesia’s unsophisticated rural 
masses are not to be distracted from the tasks of development by political parties, 
except in brief state-defined pre-election campaign periods. Under a law established 
in 1975, political parties are formally banned from establishing branches below the 
regency level, “virtually confining their activities to big towns and cities” (McDonald 
1980: 109; cf. Mackie 1976: 119). All these ideological formulas serve primarily the 
power interests of the state-qua-state.

It is widely, and largely correctly, believed in Indonesia today that “the” Chinese 
(no distinction between citizens and aliens) dominate the domestic economy under 
the protection of the state and with the backing of Chinese capital in Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore, as well as the capitalist world’s economic giants. Yet the 
Suharto leadership has also suppressed Chinese culture, closed down Chinese schools,
barred Chinese-language publications, and, most significantly, officially installed the derogatory racist word *Cina* in the place of the customary, neutral *Tiongboel*. Moreover, citizens of Chinese extraction have been more drastically excluded from official politics than at any time since 1945. In the entire fourteen years that Suharto has been president, there has never been a "Chinese" cabinet minister, though such ministers were a regular feature of the revolutionary, parliamentary, and Guided Democracy periods.14 Nor will one find any generals or senior civil servants of obvious Chinese ancestry. This ghettoization of citizen-Chinese—political exclusion and economic privilege—reminds one not only of the colonial era and Furnivall's "plural society," but of the position of the Jews in Eastern Europe under the nineteenth-century autocracies. The policy has been consistently maintained throughout the New Order period, in spite of widespread popular dissatisfaction (province-wide racial riots in 1980), and we must regard it as a central element in the leadership's strategy. Insofar as the policy of economic favoritism in practice applies to all Chinese, aliens as well as citizens, it is difficult to locate it within any obvious "national" interest. From the point of view of the state, however, it makes excellent sense, for it increases the economic resources available to the state without the need for any cession of political power. The more pariah "the" Chinese become, the more they are dependent on the apparatus. (In addition, popular antiforeign feeling can be deflected from Western and Japanese multinationals.)

The class base of the New Order has not yet been the subject of systematic research; partial exceptions are Robison (1978) and Magenda (forthcoming). But there is no good reason to believe that there was any dramatic change in the class structure between, say, 1955 and 1975. It is generally agreed that in Java the dominant class has all along been the so-called *priyayi*, deriving genealogically from the court, provincial, and village elites of precolonial times and overwhelmingly identified in this century with white-collar occupations. As mentioned earlier, in many parts of the Outer Islands petty feudalities survived intact until after independence. During the 1950s these classes continued (Java) or began (Outer Islands) to send some of their children into the state apparatus. But the weakness of the state vis-à-vis popular organizations, especially the political parties, also encouraged entry into and claims to local leadership of these organizations (where this seemed feasible). Quintessential in this respect was the PNI, the leadership of which was heavily *priyayi* and which gradually drew into itself segments of Outer Island upper classes (Magenda, forthcoming; Rocamora 1974: chaps. 4–5). The prewar nationalist credentials of many of its national-level leaders, the apparent favor of President Sukarno, and astute exploitation of the residual social prestige and patronage networks of the classes that dominated it made the PNI the most successful party in Indonesia's only free nationwide parliamentary election, which took place in 1955 (Feith 1957: for the PNI's role, see Rocamora 1974: chaps. 4–5). From 22.3 percent of the vote in that year, however, its share shrank abruptly to 6.9 percent in 1971. In 1977, after Suharto had coerced it into a merger with two Christian parties and a few other minor non-Muslim parties, the resulting "party" won only 8.6 percent of the vote (MacDonald 1980: 107, 239). In 1982 it won about 8 percent.

The obvious beneficiary of the PNI's eclipse was the *state* party Golkar, summoned

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14 Informally, a number of citizens of Chinese descent, such as Liem Bian-kie, Harry Tjan Silalahi, and Panglaykim, have exercised a good deal of political influence from within Ali Murtopo's Special Operations apparatus. In another sort of regime, men of their abilities would probably long since have achieved cabinet rank.
into existence for the elections of 1971. Golkar's electoral successes in 1971, 1977, and 1982 have always been principally due to the activities of the two most powerful arms of the state: the Ministry of Defense (using the territorial chain of military command) and the Ministry of the Interior. If I am correct in arguing that the social bases of Golkar and the PNI are similar to each other, then it is difficult to account for the pulverization of the PNI at Golkar's expense in terms of class. (In addition to the constituencies of the old PNI, Golkar exploited the cowed residuum of the PKI's former supporters, who sought safety in obedience to officialdom.) It seems clear that the key difference between the two organizations, and the basis for the one's triumph over the other, is that Golkar articulates the interests of the state-qua-state, and the PNI merely the interests of the class from which many functionaries of that state have been drawn. In effect, that class has been told that its interests will be served only through the mediation of the *apparat*.

**Security Policy**

One of the most curious aspects of New Order policy—given the regime's domination by the military—has been its neglect of the armed forces as armed forces, both in terms of basic amenities for the lower ranks and in terms of equipment and training. Military budgets were quite modest during the 1970s, typically less than 20 percent of total official outlays. But sizable additional sums came in from unofficial sources: military-controlled monopolies, institutional corruption, and, up to its collapse in 1975, the state oil corporation, Pertamina. Crouch cites a March 4, 1970, editorial in the official armed forces newspaper *Angkatan Bersenjata* to the effect that the forces' budget covered only half of their operational requirements (1978: 274). Sizable new armaments were not acquired until 1976. Nothing better measures the consequences for the professional fighting capacities of the military than the shambles made of the initial December 7, 1975, invasion of East Timor and the fact that, in spite of horrific antipopulation measures taken in 1977–1978, the resistance of Fretelin nationalists still had not been crushed seven years later, as 1981's intensified fighting attests. Until recently, the main arms purchases have been such things as OV-10 Broncos, valuable for counterinsurgency operations, but useless for external defense. This neglect cannot easily be explained by any sparseness of the state's financial resources, particularly after the OPEC windfall of 1973. The fact is that for a nation of Indonesia's size, population, and strategic location, her 250 thousand or so strong military remains remarkably small, underarmed, and undertrained.

Many observers have welcomed this modesty as a sign of Suharto's firm determination to commit the bulk of the nation's resources to the economic development of the country and the welfare of the population. I myself am inclined to emphasize the interesting parallels between the contemporary Indonesian armed forces and the old

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15 Thus, Interior Minister General Amir Machmud arranged for the issuance of Presidential Regulation No. 6/ 1970, whereby civil servants were "denied the right to engage in political activity (read: party activity) and were required to show 'monoloyalty' to the government (read: GOLKAR)" (Emmerson 1978: 106–107). After the 1971 elections, Korpri, a union for all civil servants, was established to enforce "monoloyalty" organizationally.

16 When the Buginese aristocrat, General Andi Muhammad Yusuf, replaced General M. Pangga-bean as Minister of Defense in spring 1978, he won sudden popularity by making unannounced visits to inspect the housing and equipment of the rank- and-file troops, and then expressing publicly his concern at the sad conditions he found prevailing.
Dutch-colonial KNIL. The KNIL was small in size, and poorly trained and equipped by the standards of the day. The colonial state could afford to keep things this way because it relied for external protection on close ties with the hegemonic naval power of the era—Great Britain—which had its own geopolitical reasons for proferring this protection. (Great Britain deliberately cultivated friendly ties with the small powers situated across the Channel [Holland and Belgium] and at the mouth of the Mediterranean [Portugal].) The KNIL nonetheless was quite capable of maintaining order within the huge colony, aided by a complex of police forces and a vast network of informers.

In the same way, the real external security of the contemporary beambtenstaat is provided by the huge naval and air forces of the United States, with which, as we have seen, the Indonesian Army has long had the most intimate ties. The state’s security has been further enhanced by the development in stages since 1971 of the Washington-Peking-Tokyo entente. Under these circumstances, “Indonesia” faces no credible external military threat, a situation unlikely to change until Japan becomes a naval, as well as an economic, competitor of the United States in Southeast Asia. From the state’s point of view, then, there is no point in a large conventional arms buildup, which, in addition, might cause negative reactions among some of IGGI’s European donors, who have few strategic interests in Southeast Asia.

As with the KNIL, a great deal of the Indonesian military’s time, resources, and energy have been devoted to the internal defense of the state. The obvious symbol of this is the central locus of power within the armed forces: Kopkamtib, an acronym for Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Command for the Restoration of Security and Order or, in the words of an earlier era, rust en orde), which was set up by Suharto in October 1965 to direct the obliteration of the PKI. Seventeen years later, Kopkamtib still exists (its restorative task forever to be unachieved?) and is possibly even more powerful than in its salad days. Supplementing Kopkamtib are the huge official state intelligence apparatus Bakin, Ali Murtopo’s Special Operations net, and a plethora of other intelligence-cum-internal security hierarchies.

As with the KNIL, the activities of the military under Suharto’s leadership have involved local aggrandizement. The invasion of East Timor is a case in point. Objectively considered, even a leftist-controlled independent East Timor presented no more substantial a threat than did “fanatically Muslim” Aceh to the Netherlands East Indies a century ago. Nor does East Timor offer more promising economic rewards than did that northern tip of Sumatra. Like Aceh to Batavia, East Timor appeared to Jakarta as a presumptuous nuisance to be disposed of by the methods used for the maintenance of internal security: political manipulations, population controls, counterinsurgency sweeps, and calculated terror.17 (In both cases the “enemy” turned out to be much tougher than was initially anticipated.)

Conclusion

I argued at the outset that the amalgam “nation-state” is rather recent, and that often it conjoins a popular, participatory nation with an older adversarial state. If this

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17 The secret manipulations carried out by Ali Murtopo’s Special Operations apparatus are excellently described in McDonald (1980: chap. 9). The grim toll taken by the counterinsurgency campaigns has been extensively detailed in a succession of hearings, beginning in 1977, held by the sub-committees on International Organizations and on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the U.S. Congress, House of Representatives (March 23, 1977; June 28, July 19, 1977; February 15, 16, 28, 1978; March 7, 8, 1978; February 4, 6, 7, 1980).
argument makes sense, one should expect the policy behavior of the amalgam to vary in character according to the predominance of one or other of its components. I have attempted to illustrate this argument by a schematic account of the vicissitudes of the state in Indonesia from late colonial times to the present. Finally, I have endeavored to demonstrate the validity of the basic distinction by analyzing key aspects of the policy behavior of the New Order, which may seem unintelligible from the point of view of the new nation's interest but are quite rational from that of the old state. I make this argument in full awareness of the attractions of a more strictly class-based analysis, but the intense and inconclusive debate over "the state" among neo-Marxist theorists in recent years suggests that "there is something there" that does not straightforwardly "fit" with such analysis. I hope that this essay may contribute toward some useful rearrangement of the pieces.

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